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Acquiring and Exercising Citizenship: 
The New Second Generation in the United States1 
 
Renee Luthra, Thomas Soehl, Roger Waldinger 
 
 
 
This paper focuses on the ways in which the distinctively interna-
tional aspects of population movements across borders affects the 
experience of the children of immigrants – whether born abroad and 
                                                 
1 This paper is a chapter from an in-process book, Second Generation Trajectories, 
written by Renee Luthra, Thomas Soehl, and Roger Waldinger, and to be submit-
ted to the Russell Sage Foundation Press in fall 2016.  The book is based on an 
analysis of two, exceptionally valuable, indeed unique, sources of data:  the Immi-
grant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York survey (henceforth, IS-
GMNY), conducted in 1998 and 1999, and the Immigration and Intergenerational 
Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey (henceforth, IIMMLA), conducted in 
2004.  These two ventures were both funded by the Russell Sage Foundation as 
part of the Foundation’s long-term investment in the data and intellectual resources 
needed to understand contemporary immigration and its consequences.  As the 
outgrowth of a single, ongoing effort, these two surveys overlap in significant 
ways: they both sought to answer similar questions and hence queried respondents 
in similar, sometimes, identical ways.  Moreover, they both adopted similar meth-
odologies, namely, telephone surveys of young adult immigrant offspring, either 
born in the United States to at least one foreign-born parent or born abroad but 
raised in the United States, supplemented by interviews with third generation (or 
more) respondents of white, black, and Hispanic background.  Respondents’ ages 
ran from 18 to 32 in ISGMNY and 20 to 39 in IIMMLA.  The pooled sample in-
cludes 7,914 respondents, of whom 4,523 were surveyed in the Los Angeles region 
and 3,391 were surveyed in the New York area.  The bulk of this chapter draws on 
interviews with the immigrant origin respondents, of whom 3,309 were surveyed 
by IIMMLA and 2,430 by ISGMNY.  Respondents originated in 76 different coun-
tries, in addition to those born in the United States to U.S.-born parents as well as 
respondents born in or originating in Puerto Rico. For further details about IS-
GMNY, see Kasinitz et al, 2008; for further details about IIMMLA, see Bean et al, 
2015. 
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raised in the United States or born in the United States themselves.  
The international impinges directly on the acquisition and exercise of 
citizenship, the topics treated in this chapter. On the one hand, every 
emigrant departs as a home country citizen to arrive as a destination 
country alien, a status less tractable to individual initiative than was 
the initial decision to seek a better life in a new land. For those who 
enjoy the possibility of acquiring a new citizenship and successfully 
exercise that option, the acquisition of citizenship marks the transi-
tion from the old nationality to the new. On the other hand all immi-
grants in a democratic society can exercise citizenship, as mere terri-
torial presence confers the right to engage in a broad, though not, full 
panoply of civic and political activities. Yet to access these different 
options for involvement, however, immigrants need the resources 
required for understanding a strange, new environment and for en-
gaging with civic and political matters at least one step removed 
from the demands of everyday survival.   
 
Acquiring and exercising citizenship are related, but nonetheless dis-
tinct.  Formal citizenship is a status from which every new immigrant 
is excluded whereas the exercise of citizenship is an option of which 
any new immigrant can avail. However, the options for exercising 
citizenship are also regulated by the requirements for its possession 
as status, as only citizens can vote. As many citizens, sometimes 
most, don’t cast a ballot when they can, the right to vote may not 
meaningfully distinguish those who have crossed into the polity from 
those who remain outside. Yet it is precisely because the individual 
incentives to go to the polls are so weak that political organizations, 
parties, and candidates expend so many resources in the effort to 
cajole voters to do so. Hence, those lacking the potential to vote may 
find themselves, not just excluded from the exercise of the privileges 
that come with formal citizenship, but cut off from the processes that 
produce the exercise of citizenship itself.   
 
Acquiring citizenship is a challenge for only some of the adult immi-
grant offspring with which this book is concerned: those born abroad, 
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but raised in the United States. Yet as at least one parent – usually 
both -- arrived as an alien, and that condition often proved enduring, 
non-citizen status is a background condition for the rest. Indeed, for 
all of these New Yorkers and Angelenos, the strangeness of the civic 
and political environment is part of the familial setting, albeit to var-
ying degrees. In the pages to follow, we first seek to understand the 
processes affecting the acquisition of citizenship and then go on to 
ask how these two distinctively international aspects of population 
movements across boundaries – alien status and strangeness – affect 
citizenship’s exercise among these U.S.-raised, but foreign origin 
respondents. 
 
Acquiring citizenship: As emphasized by the rational choice ap-
proach advocated by neo-assimilation theory, adaptation is driven by 
the rewards it yields.  But the assimilatory power of the pursuit of the 
good life derives from its constant action, invisible effects, and com-
patibility with a range of migrant plans – should I stay? should I re-
turn? -- which is why settlement and assimilation so often happen 
whether wanted or not. Not so the acquisition of citizenship, for 
which a deliberate effort is required. Unlike mastering the dominant 
tongue – or at least enough of it to get by – citizenship is not a quo-
tidian concern, as it can’t be reliably read from the everyday encoun-
ter.  Indeed, it is often misread, to the dismay of the naturalized citi-
zen whose accent gives away his or her foreign origin. Yet precisely 
because, in the near to medium term, citizenship provides neither 
much help nor hindrance, its acquisition is likely to be postponed.  
 
Hence, immigrants may spend years – perhaps the entirety of their 
lives in the United States -- in that conceptual liminal zone between 
the territory of the state and the internal boundary of citizenship.  
Indeed, as we shall show, such is the experience of many of the for-
eign-born respondents studied in this book and even more so, of the 
parents of both the foreign and U.S.-born. Persistent non-citizen sta-
tus seems anomalous, in light of the parents’ long tenure in the Unit-
ed States (on average, 21years) and the young age of the foreign-
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born respondents’ own arrival. As, with the exception of the Russian 
Jews, these are mainly people whose entire school experience took 
place in the United States, they are surely Americans in spirit and 
everyday life. Yet, as of the interviews, many were not citizens in 
fact, a status that many others acquired only after tarrying long.   
 
The stickiness of non-citizen status is not an anomaly; rather it stems 
from the very nature of the institution itself.  Encompassing more 
than a status and an activity, citizenship is also an identity – the sym-
bol linking the individual to the nation or people to whom he or she 
belongs. While home country citizenship may not prove of much use, 
its emotional valence often makes it hard to discard. Hence, the re-
luctance to give up the citizenship of one’s native people may deter 
one from taking on the citizenship of a previously foreign people, 
although the passage of dual nationality laws diminish the conflict by 
making new and old allegiances compatible. 
 
As status, citizenship is simultaneously a mechanism of inclusion 
and exclusion, both an instrument and an object of citizens’ social 
closure, to borrow the concepts formulated by Rogers Brubaker 
(1992). Providing status citizens with a monopoly on the vote, on 
indefinite residence, and a handful of other benefits, citizenship no 
longer serves as the potent instrument of internal closure against res-
ident non-citizens that it did during the mid-20th century era of low 
immigration. Yet if for nothing else than its symbolic importance, 
status citizenship remains a powerful object of closure, as even the 
U.S. – a state with a comparatively liberal citizenship regime – com-
pels would be citizens to vault over an increasingly high wall.   
Needless to say, resources increase the likelihood of leaping over 
with success and diminish the relative costs that the effort requires.  
Since citizenship is for the deserving only, it entails a level of scruti-
ny that some potential citizens might prefer to avoid. Hence, aspir-
ants have to decide whether the quest for citizenship is worth the 
gamble, a matter to which the answer is not crystal clear. While they 
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ponder the question, their residence within the territory but outside 
the polity persists.    
   
Exercising citizenship: Thus, exclusion from the polity – both pre-
sent and past, both direct and indirect, via one’s parents – comprises 
one of the central lines of variation among the immigrant offspring 
analyzed in this book.  In turn, we seek to understand how the exer-
cise of citizenship is affected by these varied experiences of exclu-
sion and inclusion from citizenship as status. As suggested above, the 
experience of living on the wrong side of the bright line of citizen-
ship will have an effect of its own, depressing political engagement, 
independent of exposure or other resources that might encourage 
political involvement.   
 
The conventional approach, by contrast, understands the processes 
leading to the exercise of citizenship – political assimilation – as an 
extension and by-product of the processes entailed in social assimila-
tion. In this view, the exercise of citizenship steadily grows as immi-
grants acquire the capacity to understand the world around them, 
gain the resources needed for attending to and engaging with civic 
and political matters that don’t produce immediate benefit, and de-
velop proximity and ties to a more diverse network of established 
persons more likely to transmit political signals and stimuli. That 
process will be mediated by those differences at the individual and 
familial level that can make the new environment more or less 
strange or more or less easy to learn: immigrants arriving with higher 
levels of education are likely to find the environment both less unfa-
miliar and easier to learn, advantages that should be transmissible to 
their U.S.-born or –raised children. Similarly, differences in the pace 
of parental adaptations – the speed with which they master the domi-
nant tongue and the degree to which it replaces the mother tongue 
both outside and inside the home – should facilitate or hinder the 
political and civic engagement of their children.    
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That political engagement often precedes citizenship, as demonstrat-
ed by the immigrant rights movement of the past several years, pro-
vides all the more reason to think that social and political assimila-
tion can proceed hand in hand. The blurriness of social boundaries 
facilitates and possibly encourages political participation: aliens are 
exposed to explicitly political messages directed at the citizens 
among whom they live; they often belong to organizations that en-
courage them to activate their rights and search out those entitle-
ments which they are due. Even though non-citizens lack the right to 
choose those who represent them in government, they are affected by 
government policies, providing further motivation both to attend to 
receiving society politics and to participate (Verba et al. 1995; Leal 
2002). And like citizens, non-citizens can and do contact the officials 
elected by the citizens, efforts whose impacts are magnified when 
those contacts are made as part of a broader effort encompassing 
citizens.   
 
However, it is not clear that the mechanisms producing the virtuous 
circle by which social leads to political assimilation can be fully trig-
gered while standing outside the wall of citizenship. The motivations 
that might encourage political learning are different from those pro-
pelling the social learning entailed in the quest for individual pro-
gress. Non-citizens have good reason to discover how best to navi-
gate the new environment and leverage whatever skills they might 
possess: even newly arrived undocumented immigrants need to learn 
where the day labor market is located, what wage one can expect, 
and which competencies a prospective employer is likely to want and 
reward. By contrast, non-citizens can’t vote, so why should they pay 
attention? As long as most neighbors or coworkers find themselves 
in a similar status they are unlikely to be the source of much infor-
mation or encouragement however helpful they might be in solving a 
practical housing or work-related problem. Whereas an employer 
might be open, or perhaps even eager, to promote a hard-working, 
willing immigrant worker, regardless of status, political parties and 
candidates aspiring to office are less likely to waste resources on 
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persons unable to cast a ballot. Of course, immigrant children, as 
opposed to their parents, are unlikely to find the political environ-
ment equally foreign and, through schools, are instructed in how to 
engage with and understand it. Nonetheless, growing up with parents 
with little interest or understanding in politics, without partisan at-
tachments or ideological attachments and with little, if any history, of 
political participation either before or after migration, is likely to 
yield offsetting, indirect impacts.   
 
Moreover, the exercise of citizenship is likely to be affected by long-
term effects of disparities in the political systems in the countries of 
emigration, whether having to do with differences in the degree of 
democracy, the organization of the polity, or the integrity of the po-
litical process. Those disparities might well be greater than the inter-
societal differences related to the practical matters entailed in settling 
down and moving ahead. Thus, a rural background can impart the 
skills that make a poorly educated migrant a well-suited worker on 
construction sites throughout urban America; but prior exposure to 
one party rule or government officials that only provide services 
when bribed may implant views and expectations that fit less well 
with patterns of political behavior or engagement prevailing in the 
new environment. Of course, for the New Yorkers and Angelenos 
whom we study, any such exposures are typically indirect, via their 
parents.  But as suggested by theories of political socialization, since 
parents’ political orientations were acquired early they are likely to 
be resistant to change, with any tendency towards stasis reinforced 
by the lack of legal or citizenship status. While not all of the home 
country political orientations that parents acquired before emigration 
are likely to be transmitted to children, parents’ capacity to convey 
their own understanding of the new political environment is likely to 
be quite variable, with much depending on the degree to which re-
sources, whether having to do with cognition, security, and citizen-
ship, are available. 
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1. Crossing the boundary into the polity: Citizenship acquisi-
tion 
 
Right from the beginning of its history as an independent country, 
the United States has offered immigrants easy access to citizenship 
while promising their U.S.-born children citizenship upon birth.  
Though not often noticed, these practices comprised a de facto im-
migration incentive program, reflecting the new republic’s need to 
attract a population that could fill up its land mass and help wrest 
territory from the indigenous population. While conflict over natural-
ization requirements emerged almost instantly – with the minimum 
wait period set at two years by the first Naturalization law passed in 
1790, increased to fourteen in 1798, and then lowered back to five in 
1802 – residence requirements have remained at that level ever since.  
From its outset and through the early 20th century, the procedures for 
naturalizing took ad hoc form, varying from one locality to another, 
with approval heavily influenced by the degree to which local politi-
cal regimes perceived immigrants as likely friends or foes. Those 
practices were then transformed at the turn of the 20th century, when 
the growing wave of anti-immigrant animosity eventuated in the 
Naturalization Act of 1906, shifting responsibility to the national 
level, imposing requirements for rudimentary knowledge of English 
and American civics, and mandating payment of a $6 filing fee – the 
equivalent of $120 in 2016 currency (Ueda, 1980; Schneider, 2001; 
Bloemraad and Ueda, 2011). The contours of naturalization practices 
have since then remained roughly stable, though standardizing the 
naturalization test took protracted form (Schneider, 2010) and fees 
have fluctuated – most recently increasing from $60 in 1989 to $680 
as of this writing, or 1.32 percent of median family income (Stringer, 
2016).  
 
By contrast, birthright citizenship, at outset an inheritance of English 
common law, took deeper hold during Reconstruction, as passage of 
the 14th amendment gave it constitutional status. And whereas only 
foreign-born whites and, since 1870, foreign-born blacks were 
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deemed eligible for naturalization until racial bars to citizenship ac-
quisition were lifted in 1952, law has consistently guaranteed birth-
right citizenship to all children born on U.S. soil, regardless of their 
parents’ citizenship status. Hence, unlike many countries in Europe, 
where the children and sometimes grandchildren of immigrants were 
compelled to remain citizens of the country of emigration even when 
born and raised in the country of immigration, the native born chil-
dren of immigrants have always entered life as status citizens -- an 
often taken-for granted and unacknowledged precondition of the 
multigenerational assimilation process. 
 
Yet, a large and growing population of children, often described as 
the 1.5 generation, accompanies their parents as immigrants, thus 
arriving without the benefit of birthright citizenship. The 1.5 genera-
tion is socially similar to the second-generation, as the great majority 
enters the U.S. at a very young age: in our samples of immigrant-
origin New Yorkers and Angelenos, for example,  half of the foreign-
born respondents arrived in the United States before the age of 7 and 
90 percent before reaching the age of 13 Yet the social similarity 
produced by exposure to a common environment from a very young 
age co-exists with fundamental categorical difference: just like every 
other migrant, child immigrants start as aliens and therefore immedi-
ately confront the formal, political boundary separating citizens from 
aliens. Moreover, as aliens they are not of one type, but are rather 
separated from one another by the bright boundaries linked to their 
precise legal status. Unlike the formal equality among citizens, for-
mal inequality prevails among non-citizens. Some statutorily enjoy 
most citizenship rights, occupying the conceptual space close to the 
boundary that citizenship as status demarks; others have a far more 
precarious hold, conceptually located just inside the territorial 
boundary.  
 
By contrast, the U.S. born children of immigrants all share U.S. citi-
zenship and hence begin life as formal equals. Yet, as the offspring 
of parents who entered the United States as aliens, they are likely to 
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grow up in environments where other family members lack U.S. citi-
zenship. Moreover, given the great variance, both in parents’ legal 
status at entry as well as group-level policy contexts, even U.S.-born 
children are likely to come of age in households where the presence 
of citizens vary widely. Those differences are likely to be of particu-
lar import for the concern of this chapter, as adult political orienta-
tions and loyalties, as well as civic engagements, are at least partly 
passed on from parents to their offspring.  But that process is likely 
to take different form, if parents to whom the political system is new 
and strange also find themselves barred from formal political in-
volvement. Similarly, absence of citizens in one’s immediate circle 
may dampen attentiveness to political signals, even when the formal 
right to participate is in hand. 
 
To capture these differences in citizenship density, we have created a 
simple measure of familial citizenship density by counting the num-
ber of citizens included in a parent-child trio, with the range varying 
from 0 to 3. In both New York and Los Angeles, an all citizen par-
ent-child trio accounts for the majority of cases, though in the New 
York sample the fraction barely exceeds the fifty percent level. By 
contrast, citizenship density hits zero among just under nine percent 
of the respondents, with the higher fraction among New Yorkers re-
flecting the heavier presence of immigrant offspring who arrived in 
the United States at an earlier age. But among the foreign-born, the 
fraction of no citizen parent-child combinations more than doubles, 
while the proportion of all citizen parent-child combinations drops 
under fifty percent. And though the children in question are all 
adults, parent and child statuses seem intertwined: familial citizen-
ship density falls to zero among 60 percent of those foreign-born 
respondents who have yet to become U.S. citizens but rises to virtu-
ally the same fraction (64 percent) among those New Yorkers and 
Angelenos who went through the naturalization process. 
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Figure 1: Citizenship density - number of citizens between respondent and parent 
by place of birth (left panel) and place of residence (right panel). Note: These sta-
tistics draw only on respondents aged 20 through 33 in both surveys. 
 
Disaggregating these statistics by country of origin highlights sharp 
inter-group disparities while also widening the differences between 
New York and Los Angeles. The contrasts reach their height among 
the 1.5 generation Angelenos:  among Mexicans the average citizen-
ship density barely exceeds 1, whereas among Vietnamese almost all 
(90 percent) parent-child trios have already gained citizenship.   
Though citizenship density rises among Guatemalans, Salvadorans, 
and Mexicans with generation, Asian origin nationalities show higher 
levels of citizenship density in every generational grouping.  Among 
the 2.5 generation Angelenos, every Korean and Chinese parent-
child trio is an all-citizen trio; among Mexican 2.5 generation Ange-
lenos, by contrast, 1 out of every 4 parents had yet to obtain U.S. 
citizenship. 
 
In New York, as in Los Angeles, South/Central American origin 
groups exhibit lower levels of citizenship density, though disparities 
are far less marked among the foreign-born. Among those New 
Yorkers who arrived in the U.S. after the age of 5 citizenship density 
averaged 1.2 among Dominicans, a level not appreciably lower than 
that attained by Chinese at 1.3 or Jamaicans at 1.6. Only among the 
Taiwanese did density levels exceed 2, though the scores attained by 
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the Russians and the Ukrainians suggest a rapid, family-wide shift 
towards citizenship given the recency of this group’s arrival. By the 
second generation, almost every Chinese and Hong Kong parent-
child combination was an all-citizen trio, with the Taiwanese and 
Trinidadians lagging only slightly behind. Ecuadorians and Domini-
cans lagged behind other groups, though as compared to Mexicans, 
the parents of Dominicans were far more likely to be citizens. 
 
The cases of the Taiwanese and Chinese in the two cities demon-
strate the distinct characteristics of these migration streams. Whereas 
citizenship density was low among the China-born New Yorkers, and 
especially so among those who arrived after the age of six, all-citizen 
parent-child combinations prevailed among the China-born Angele-
nos. Yet, contrasting second generation respondents shows greatly 
reduced disparities. 
 
In part, these inter-group disparities reflect differences in the lon-
gevity of the various migration streams.  As naturalization is general-
ly possible only after 5 years of legal residence, the nationalities 
among which new arrivals are particularly prevalent will be prone to 
lower naturalization rates. But while time spent in the host society 
yields exposure and thereby directly facilitates language acquisition 
or socio-economic mobility, its impact on the acquisition of citizen-
ship is far more conditional, as the clock only starts ticking with the 
acquisition of legal permanent residents. As most new legal perma-
nent residents are not new immigrants, but rather persons who previ-
ously came to the U.S. in some other status – whether as legal 
“nonimmigrant” tourists, students, temporary workers, or intercom-
pany transferees or as unauthorized entrants – differences in the poli-
cy context as well as disparities in the ties to citizens, permanent res-
idents, and employers who can sponsor new arrivals will make for 
cross-group divergence in citizenship take-up rates. 
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Figure 2: Citizenship density in families of foreign-born respondents by country of 
origin. 
 
Yet even among those eligible, few actually naturalize. For example 
at the beginning of 2010 of an estimated 12 million Legal Permanent 
Residents roughly 8 million were eligible to naturalize2 yet in that 
year just shy of 620,000 or 5% did naturalize3. This statistic under-
lines yet another difference distinguishing crossing the political 
boundary of citizenship from the crossing of social boundaries sepa-
rating immigrants from natives: As conceptualized by Alba and Nee 
(2003) crossing the latter is a seamless unbounded process, begin-
ning from the moment of entry into a new society, at which time the 
immigrant begins to make sense of the very different surrounding 
environment; as each new competency and each new insight gener-
ates some additional opportunity – if only by easing the difficulties 
of day-to-day survival – it continues ceaselessly and without notice. 
In contrast citizenship is not only a clearly defined unambiguous 
boundary, but crossing it is a discrete step requiring deliberate action. 
For those arriving undocumented and thus in the most vulnerable 
status, the trajectory is likely to involve a series of transitions across 
formal status boundaries. Each of those transitions is time-
consuming, costly, and often painfully uncertain, thereby draining 
                                                 
2 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2010.pdf 
3 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2010.pdf 
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resources that can be used for the effort to move ahead. And persons 
in an alien status can rarely cross these barriers on their own: unlike 
the process of social assimilation, where each step leads the immi-
grant to take another, moving from one civic strata to another re-
quires expert help and even the experts are unable to ensure success. 
 
On the most practical level applying for citizenship requires navi-
gating a long bureaucratic process that – as  famously summarized in 
the title of David North’s (1987) “The Long Grey Welcome” – may 
repel as much if not more than it appeals. As Irene Bloemraad ( 
2006) argued in her comparative study of citizenship acquisition in 
the United States and Canada, as an agency, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) prioritized its enforcement over its inte-
grative functions, with an organizational culture stamped by the pre-
occupation with control. While border and interior enforcement have 
since been spun off to a new entity, the ethos prevailing in INS’s 
successor agency is unlikely to have changed greatly. Among mi-
grants the INS and it successor agency, US Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services (USCIS) suffers from the image of an organization to 
be avoided whenever possible with stories about negative treatment 
abounding (Alvarez, 1987). Applicants need to ready themselves to 
take a test of English ability and basic facts about the United States. 
Although the vast majority of applicants passes -- almost 96% in 
FY2010 and 93% in FY2011 (USCIS) -- the ordeal may discourage 
some potential citizens, especially those with little or prior test-
taking history. This factor likely weighs less heavily on the 1.5 gen-
eration -- most likely to be fluent in English and familiar with the 
basic subjects covered by the test – than on immigrants who arrived 
as adults. Since the process also entails a thorough review of an ap-
plicant’s immigration history and record, which in turn could uncov-
er a problem, heretofore invisible, that could threaten permanent res-
idence status – concerns over the negative consequences of close 
scrutiny clearly lead some potential citizens to stay clear of the entire 
process. Costs entail a further deterrent, one of ever greater weight 
since the late 1980s, when INS and then USCIS, were transformed 
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into agencies funded, not by the U.S. Treasury, but by user fees; be-
tween 1988 and 2015 fees rose five-fold in constant terms, with bare-
ly three percent of applicants granted waivers (Stringer, 2016:6-8). 
 
Though confronting potential citizens with significant material and 
informational barriers, the benefits conferred by citizenship have 
remained mainly symbolic, with limited concrete benefits. Naturali-
zation provides the ticket of entry to the polity, an outcome that 
could yield significant effect if large numbers of naturalized citizens 
voted and even more so if naturalization numbers were to grow. Yet 
if some new citizens clearly prize voting – as suggested by Sofya 
Aptekar’s (2015) interviews with applicants waiting for their natural-
ization interviews – others prove indifferent – as indicated by the 
relatively low level of electoral participation among Asian immi-
grants, who naturalize at high levels but then only occasionally go to 
the polls. Beyond the vote, new citizens gain few opportunities in 
addition to those they already possessed as legal permanent residents: 
unlike the situation a half century ago, citizenship rarely serves a 
prerequisite for employment, a few branches of the government and 
selected grant programs excepted. By contrast, a US passport may 
offer both greater security when traveling and greater freedom of 
international movement, a question of importance to immigrants 
from countries whose passport holders need visas to enter the devel-
oped world. And whereas permanent residents need to return to the 
United States every six months, U.S. citizens can remain abroad in-
definitely without risking loss of citizenship – a consideration likely 
to matter in the eyes of the 1.5 generation respondents whom we 
study, as many have parents and relatives abroad and indeed, have 
undertaken much foreign travel. A more powerful motivation may be 
the impact of U.S. citizenship on facilitating the immigration of close 
relatives still abroad – a goal substantially facilitated once citizenship 
is in hand, as there is no numerical limitation on the number of 
spouses, minor children, and parents sponsored by U.S. citizens.    
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Yet the most compelling of citizenship’s concrete benefits may de-
rive from its quality as an insurance policy, guaranteeing against the 
risk of deportation. In contrast to citizenship, legal permanent resi-
dency is a conditional status, – revocable by the state without much 
legal recourse, with the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in conjunction with the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) greatly increasing the 
number of violations that could trigger deportation. Indeed, the abso-
lute number of permanent residents experiencing deportation has 
soared in the years following the acts, climbing from 15,539 in 1994 
to 24,702 ten years later 2004.4 Yet, for the individual legal perma-
nent resident, the risk of deportation remains very low. Given an es-
timated legal permanent resident population of 11.6 million in 2004 
(Rytina 2004) this translates into a probability of just 0.2% per year. 
 
But citizenship is not just a legal and political status – it also denotes 
nationality. Not only are national identity and self-identity deeply 
entwined; national identity is understood as relational, distinguishing 
“us” from “them.” As citizenship acquisition is called naturalization, 
that is, a result linked to the very constitution of a person, the now 
standard definition of assimilation as a decline in an ethnic difference 
can’t apply. Instead, given citizenship’s fundamentally symbolic 
quality, its acquisition involves the shift from one particularism to 
another, which is why it is conditioned by emotional and affective 
concerns as well as material costs and benefits. For non-citizens who 
arrived in the United States as children and attended schools where 
they saluted the American flag on a daily basis, the symbolic conflict 
between old and new nationality may exercise little effect.  Yet those 
same considerations may weigh heavily in the eyes of parents and 
close relatives raised, socialized, and possibly still living abroad and 
whose feelings and opinions about naturalization may count. Just like 
the decision to leave home – which often reflects a family-level strat-
                                                 
4 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2010.pdf 
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egy and not simply the migrants’ individual preferences -- the deci-
sion to take on a new national identity may be influenced by the ac-
tions and preferences of the migrants’ closest kin. Given the asym-
metry between naturalization’s material and informational costs, on 
the one hand, and its largely symbolic benefits on the other, a family 
level decision to proceed together may be the critical element in tip-
ping the balance toward naturalization’s favor. 
 
We now proceed in two steps, to assess just how these factors affect-
ed citizenship patterns among the immigrant origin Angelenos and 
New Yorkers studied in this book. To probe the differences in citi-
zenship density in families shown in tables 1 and 2 in greater detail 
we estimate an extended beta-binomial regression predicting the 
number of family members (respondent plus parents) possessing US 
citizenship at the time of interview – a variable ranging from 0 to 3. 
This analysis is summarized in table 3 and combines both the NYC 
and Los Angeles data and considers both 1.5 generation and 2nd 
generation respondents. As the ISGMNY data does not provide in-
formation on when respondents or their parents naturalized, we then 
turn to the IIMMLA data and employ an event history model to ana-
lyze the timing of naturalization decisions of the 1.5 generation re-
spondents. Unlike the U.S. census and most other data sources used 
in the analysis of citizenship acquisition, IIMMLA survey asked re-
spondents both whether they had naturalized and if so when U.S. 
citizenship had been acquired. We draw on this information, as well 
as responses to questions about the year of immigration to the United 
States to generate a variable for the number of years separating arri-
val in the U.S. from acquisition of U.S. citizenship. We then use a 
discrete time proportional hazard analysis to model the time it takes a 
1.5 generation respondent to become a US citizen upon entry into the 
US. 
 
The results for the key independent variables are consistent across 
the two analyses which gives us confidence that findings do not 
simply reflect a statistical fluke. Yet the two dependent variables also 
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place different emphases: The family level citizenship density varia-
ble is especially suited to family level processes and gives a broad 
picture of migrant families in the two cities. The naturalization tim-
ing variable on the other hand affords a more detailed view of the 
naturalization processes of 1.5 generation individuals. 
 
1.1 Conditions of arrival: places of birth and legal status 
 
As outlined above, the status with which family members arrived 
acts as a central determinant of naturalization. By default citizenship 
densities will be higher among families in which one parent was born 
in the United States (in the 2.5 generation) or in which the respond-
ent (the second generation) was born in the US. In the family-level 
model we enter this information with one indicator variable identify-
ing the place of birth of the respondent (U.S. or abroad) and another 
identifying a parent born in the United States. Not surprisingly, citi-
zenship densities prove higher in families with members born in the 
US: holding other things equal, citizenship densities among the fami-
lies of 2nd generation respondents average 2.5 (out of 3), but only 2 
among those 1.5 generation families in which the respondent arrived 
before age 6 falling to 1.8 among the families of those 1.5 genera-
tions respondents who that arrived after age 6. Clearly birthright citi-
zenship matters, but as we will see, the gap separating the 1.5 and 
2nd generation families is of similar magnitude to a number of other 
differences. 
 
We remind the reader that only legal permanent residents enjoy eli-
gibility for naturalization (after passage of the 5 year waiting period).  
Unfortunately, we lack information on status at arrival for parents in 
the New York City data and thus cannot consider the impact of par-
ents’ on-arrival status in the family level analysis. While that infor-
mation is found in IIMMLA, the survey lacks data on the date when 
permanent residency was acquired and the citizenship clock began to 
tick. Nonetheless, since IIMMLA allows us to control for respond-
ents’ legal status upon arrival, we can see that the naturalization tra-
LIEPP Working Paper n° 58 
20 
jectories of those who arrived without legal permanent resident status 
diverge strongly from those who arrived with legal status, as shown 
in Figure 3. Whereas roughly half of the respondents who arrived in 
the U.S. as legal permanent residents naturalized after 15 years of 
residence, it took roughly 25 years of residence for the fraction of 
respondents arriving without lawful permanent residence to reach 
that same fifty percent mark. Adding a further variable now separat-
ing out those who entered as legal temporary “nonimmigrants” from 
those who arrived either without authorization or as unauthorized 
immigrants shows that those who entered the United States with as 
legally present, but temporary “nonimmigrants” actually experienced 
the slowest legalization trajectories. 
 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative probability of naturalizing for 1.5 generation respondents 
(IIMMLA survey) by status of entry 
 
1.2 Settlement and adaptation: Time in the US 
 
Settlement (time spent in the US) is the second major predictor of 
both naturalization and of its prevalence among families. We focus 
on three aspects of settlement likely to spur the acquisition of citizen-
ship.  
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At the most basic level, greater time spent in the United States yields 
greater opportunities for naturalization. In the family level model 
predicting the number of citizens we measure time by including the 
number of years the parents stayed in the US taking the maximum of 
both parents. For our individual-level analysis of naturalization of 1.5 
generation respondents we include information on the age at which 
they arrived (expecting that those who arrived at older ages will be 
less likely to have naturalized by the time of interview) as well as the 
age at the time of the survey. Each respondent is considered at “risk” 
of naturalizing every year since entry to the US. The data has one 
case for each person-year until the respondent is naturalized. Once 
naturalized, the respondent is removed from the data (“risk set”) and 
no longer figures in the analysis. The model includes a 3rd order pol-
ynomial for time to control for the fact that those who have lived 
longer in the US will have had more opportunity to naturalize (base-
line hazard).5 
                                                 
5 One issue in this type of analysis is the question when “the clock starts ticking” 
that is -when does a person for the first time become at “risk” of naturalizing. As 
already (Bernard, 1936) notes, just because two persons have resided for the same 
amount of time in the US before being naturalized does not mean that they waited 
the same amount of time. One could have arrived as a child or undocumented and 
thus not been eligible for naturalization for several years while another arriving as 
an adult may have been eligible much earlier. Unfortunately the IIMMLA survey 
does not provide reliable data on these issues and so we “start the clock” as soon as 
a person enters the US. However, we do include several control variables for status 
at arrival and age at arrival. A significant share of respondents (26%) became citi-
zens before their 18th birthday. Many of these naturalizations likely are “proxy 
naturalizations” that is children become citizens automatically as their parents 
naturalize. The decision making processes for these will be somewhat different - 
with parental involvement playing a much greater role - from those naturalizations 
where the 1.5 generation is of age. However omitting respondents who naturalized 
before age 18 is problematic as it again introduces censoring into the data this time 
omitting those who are most eager to naturalize. However, to test the robustness of 
our results we estimated these models also using only those respondents who natu-
ralized at age 18 or later and note any significant differences. 
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In addition to opportunity, time spent in the US also creates eligibil-
ity: With the exception of the foreign-born spouses of U.S. citizens – 
a category to which, as immigrant youth, none of our respondents 
belong -- immigrants need spend at least 5 years in the US before 
becoming eligible for naturalization, a factor that explains the large 
difference between the most newly arrived respondents and those 
living in the United States for 5 years or more. Indeed, the family-
level analysis shows that, other things equal, the model predicts just 
one citizen (on average 1.2) among families in which the first parent 
arrived less than 5 years before the survey, but predicts 1.7 for all 
those in which parents spent 5 to 10 years in the US. However, even 
once legal hurdles are cleared, not all that are eligible naturalize right 
away. Accordingly our model predicts a significant increase in citi-
zenship density for those with 11 to 20 years of parental residency – 
a predicted citizenship density of 2.15 (out of a possible 3). However 
we see no statistically significant increase in citizenship density for 
further increases (21 years or more) in US residence. 
 
1.3 Competencies and skills 
 
Although taking the discrete, conscious step to apply for citizenship, 
with all of the temporal, informational, and material burdens it en-
tails, fundamentally differs from the seamless process of social as-
similation, the competencies that immigrants acquire in the pursuit of 
socio-economic mobility almost surely matter for citizenship acquisi-
tion as well. Proficiency in English ranks especially high among 
those competencies, not simply because the citizenship exam tests 
for familiarity with English, but because that skill makes the US po-
litical and institutional environment accessible. Hence, immigrant 
parents possessing higher proficiencies in English will find the hur-
dles entailed in applying for naturalization lower and the benefits of 
citizenship more tangible. Similarly those possessing more formal 
education may be less hesitant to engage the bureaucratic process 
that citizenship acquisition involves and will on average have more 
experience with host country political life. Our analysis shows that 
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on the family level parental knowledge of English language is im-
portant. With other factors held equal we predict a significantly high-
er share of the family (2.5 out of 3) to be naturalized where both par-
ents speak English as compared to families where none do (2.1 out of 
3). Whereas parental proficiency in English clearly matters, parental 
educational attainment yields a more modest effect: Although the 
coefficient is statistically significant, substantively the association is 
small. The difference in the expected number of citizens in the fami-
ly between the those with the lowest and the highest levels of English 
ability translates into a difference of more than 28 years of education 
– a gap not commonly found, the highly unequal levels of education 
among immigrants to the US notwithstanding. The association with 
respondent’s education is somewhat stronger. But we should empha-
size here that this is strictly an association as time order or causality 
cannot be inferred from the data we have. 
 
The event history model of naturalization timing in the 1.5 genera-
tion confirms these results and sheds further light into these process-
es. Again we don’t see an effect of parental education, a finding that 
suggests that parental English ability shapes the naturalization trajec-
tories of families via parental naturalization, but exercises little direct 
effect on the citizenship trajectories of the 1.5 generation.  
 
Parental English-language ability may constrain the degree of en-
gagement with US politics and institutions and thereby delay chil-
dren’s naturalization. Yet once controlling for parents’ English-
language competency, language practices at home may not yield any 
direct relationship, as those practices may reflect an effort to transmit 
home-country language to the next generation and not necessarily an 
ability to engage host-country politics.6 Indeed, the analyses shows 
                                                 
6 The coding of this variable varies across the two analyses. To assure comparable 
answer categories we collapse this variable into three distinctions when using the 
combined dataset but use the full range of four options when analyzing only the 
IIMMLA data.  
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that the practice found in respondents’ childhood home – whether 
using English only, English in combination with a foreign language, 
or another language mainly – yields no impact on citizenship take-up 
rates. 
 
1.4 Social and political context of reception 
 
The decision to naturalize is also embedded in the larger social and 
political context; while this context clearly varies across countries 
(see Bloemraad 2006) it may also vary within countries. In our case, 
once we account for control variables, we find no effect for the local 
context, as there are no significant differences in the citizenship 
composition of the families of the New York and Los Angeles re-
spondents. Of course, these two capitals of immigrant America pro-
vide a supportive environment, both as a result of local administra-
tions that have become increasingly immigrant friendly – with New 
York leading the way – and because of the density of social service 
agencies that can provide citizenship training (Mollenkopf and Pas-
tor, 2016).  By contrast, local context might emerge as a more power-
ful factor, were we able to extend the comparison to a broader set of 
places, in particular, the cities and particularly towns that emerged as 
“new destinations” for immigrants since the 1990s, many of which 
shifted to a more aggressively anti-immigrant stance after the great 
recession of 2008.  
 
While our datasets, as surveys of two places, are ill-suited to assess 
the importance of geographic context, they contain immigrant off-
spring from a myriad of country and thereby provide traction on the 
ways in which national-level differences in the reception context 
affect the naturalization decision. For acquisition of citizenship, the 
policy context, which we define as the prevalence of more (refugee) 
or less (undocumented) advantaged statuses, is likely to be a factor of 
particular importance. In general, we anticipate that prevalence of 
more advantageous statuses – in particular, refugee statuses – will 
facilitate the acquisition of citizenship, though the mechanisms link-
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ing policy context to naturalization decisions may vary. Prevalence 
may yield a direct effect: the greater density of persons with more 
advantageous statuses means that a higher fraction is eligible to natu-
ralize, increasing the likelihood that more will take advantage of the 
opportunity, in turn providing examples for others and thereby di-
minishing the informational costs and uncertainties entailed in natu-
ralization. Since peer judgments typically matter, independent, but 
parallel decisions to opt for citizenship might indicate a community-
wide consensus, thereby the symbolic dilemmas entailed in acquiring 
a new nationality. Prevalence could also yield influence through its 
communicative effect, with more commonly found advantageous 
statuses signaling that membership in the new nation would be wel-
comed and more commonly found disadvantageous statuses portend-
ing rejection. While our data do not allow us to identify the precise 
mechanism, the regressions nonetheless point to the impact of our 
policy context measure. Controlling for all other variables, the analy-
sis predicts citizen density rates of 2.6 (out of a family of 3) for na-
tionalities with the most favorable policy context as opposed to 2.1 
for those with the most negative policy rating. Even though the event 
history analysis includes individual-level controls for status upon 
entry, we nonetheless observe that respondents from groups that face 
a more favorable governmental reception context naturalize substan-
tially faster than those who face a negative context. In contrast we do 
not find significant effects for our measure of social reception (aver-
age skin-tone of national-origin group). Similarly resources of the 
co-ethnic community (as indicated by average level of education) do 
not yield significant effects.  
 
1.5 The sending context  
 
While the decision to naturalize concerns engagement with the polity 
“here”, in the host country, the imprint of political socialization 
“there” - the society of origin will likely matter as well. Controlling 
for features of the receiving context (see above) we can now examine 
features of the sending-country context. As our analysis focuses on 
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persons born abroad but raised in the United States, we anticipate 
that any sending country influences will mainly take place through 
the indirect effects of socialization in the parental household and 
exposure via the co-ethnic community, though visits to the country of 
origin may be an additional source of direct influence. 
 
For our analysis we draw on two measures from the World-Values 
Survey that have been linked to both the level of economic develop-
ment and the functioning of liberal-democratic institutions: the send-
ing country’s position on the traditional vs. secular-rational dimen-
sion and the position on the survival vs. self-expression dimension. 
Both variables contain items that are potentially relevant for the ac-
quisition of citizenship. On the dimension from traditional to ration-
al/secular orientations those on the traditional end of the scale exhibit 
higher national pride and respect for authority, higher religiosity and 
obedience. The second dimension, survival vs. self-expression, con-
tains items that speak to the willingness to express political opinions 
and social trust. Higher self-expression values are also strongly asso-
ciated with more progressive attitudes towards gender equality.  
 
While our regression models find no association between a country’s 
position on the traditional v rational-spectrum and either naturaliza-
tion or family-level citizenship densities; the analysis does point to 
the influence cast by the survival/self-expression axis. Citizenship 
densities are higher among families originating in societies more 
inclined towards survival-values; likewise, 1.5 generation respond-
ents from these same societies show steeper naturalization trajecto-
ries as compared to those from societies where political self-
expression was more highly valued. 
 
These results clearly show that origin influences matter, even after 
controlling for different dimensions of the reception context as well 
as individual characteristics. While the associations allow for a num-
ber of interpretations they seem to rule out the most obvious hypoth-
esis, namely, that immigrants coming from societies where political 
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self-expression is valued are more likely to opt for citizenship in the 
United States. Rather the results point to a channel between a surviv-
al orientation, inclining persons towards risk- and uncertainty-
reduction, and the strategy that Gilbertson and Singer have described 
as protective naturalization, in which the goal of insuring against 
adverse changes in the social and political context and guaranteeing 
continued residence in the United States motivates the decision to 
acquire U.S. citizenship (Gilbertson and Singer 2003). Alternatively, 
the survival orientation may influence outcomes through its impact 
on familial cohesion, with families stemming from more solidaristic 
societies more likely to naturalize as a unit. Further analysis, interact-
ing the coefficient for the policy context with the coefficient for loca-
tion on the survival/self-expression shows that among respondents 
from countries confronting more adverse political reception contexts 
the association with higher survival values is especially strong, fur-
ther suggesting a direct link from home country survival orientations 
and naturalizations. 
 
2. Bright versus blurry boundaries: Exercising citizenship 
 
Conventional perspectives approach immigrant political behavior as 
if it were just like other aspects of assimilation, whereas we contend 
that initial formal exclusion exercises deep and long-lasting effects. 
We therefore begin the empirical inquiry at exactly this point, com-
paring how social assimilation affects political participation as op-
posed to at-entry formal exclusion.  As in the preceding chapters, the 
logic of the analysis builds on our knowledge of time order: we want 
to see how the conditions under which our respondents grew up in-
fluence their later behavior as adults. Because only IIMMLA pro-
vides information on respondents’ and parents’ status at time of arri-
val, as well as the timing of naturalization, we confine this portion of 
the analysis to the Los Angeles respondents only. 
 
If political incorporation is an extension of social assimilation, then 
the same rational choice processes emphasized by neo-assimilation 
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theory should lie behind second-generation engagement with politics.  
Gaining competence in the dominant language develops just as the 
conventional approach insists, growing with time and exposure as 
language learning is impelled by the need to acquire competencies 
rewarded and valued by the destination society. In turn, a greater 
capacity to comprehend and make sense of the world around one 
should facilitate exposure to political signals and increase one’s abil-
ity to make sense of political matters. By contrast, the more a foreign 
language dominates, the more foreign the political environment will 
appear. For that reason, we take language in the parental household 
as a window for seeing how social assimilation could yield political 
impacts. Since differences in parent’s ability to speak English should 
affect their capacity to first absorb political information and then 
transmit those lessons to their children, we hypothesize that foreign-
ness will be negatively related to political and civic engagement, 
which will rise instead with greater parental English language capaci-
ty. 
 
But as we have argued above, the experience of living on the wrong 
side of the bright line of citizenship will have an effect of its own, 
depressing political engagement, independent of exposure or other 
resources that might encourage political involvement. We hypothe-
size that past and present formal exclusion from the polity, net of all 
other factors including our measure of foreign-ness, will yield nega-
tive effects on a broad range of political and civic involvements, in-
cluding those for which citizenship is not required. We measure past 
and present political exclusion with a five category variable distin-
guishing birthright citizens – all with at least one foreign-born parent 
and comprising two-thirds of the sample -- from foreign-born re-
spondents, who are in turn classified into four categories, those who 
became citizens between ages 0 and 16, those who became citizens 
between ages 17 and 20, those who became citizens between the ages 
of 21 to 38, and those who had not acquired citizenship by the time 
of the survey.  A little over 7 percent (7.27 percent) of the respond-
ents became US citizens by age 16; those acquiring citizenship be-
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tween ages 17 to 20 and 21 to 38 each comprised roughly 8 percent 
of the same (7.93% and 8.43% respectively); those who never natu-
ralized accounted for 10 percent of the sample. Recalculating these 
percentages using foreign-born as the denominator tells us that fully 
30 percent of those Los Angeles respondents born outside the U.S. 
had not yet obtained citizenship as of the time of the survey, as com-
pared to just under 20 percent who had naturalized in childhood or 
early adolescence. 
 
In our view, naturalization represents the activation of the political 
self in the country of reception. Consequently we seek to draw fur-
ther insight from theories of political socialization, a literature which 
has long focused on the role of age in the socialization process. Some 
scholars in this field have argued that the age period from preteen to 
early adulthood is the time during which one's political perceptions 
crystallize and maturate (e.g. Alwin 1991, Merelman and King 1986, 
Merelman 1972). Several studies demonstrate that behavior during 
the formative years has a strong effect on the political involvement 
during adulthood (e.g.Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, McFar-
land and Thomas 2006, Merelman and King 1986) and that, after 
these formative years, individuals' political attitudes (and, presuma-
bly, behaviors) are highly stable throughout lifetime (e.g.Prior 2010, 
Stoker and Jennings 2008, Jennings and Markus 1984). 
  
In this light, not just if, but when, naturalization occurs is likely to 
yield a long-term effect. When this self is activated prior to the age at 
which time most youth begin to form their own adult political identi-
ties, greater engagement should ensue. By contrast, individuals who 
approach the formative period of early adulthood while remaining 
outside of the polity are less likely to engage and create a US cen-
tered political self.  
 
Furthermore, for the 1.5 generation the circumstances under which 
naturalization occurs varies with biographical time. Among our for-
eign-born respondents, naturalization prior to the age of 16 was 
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closely synchronized with the naturalization of their parents (occur-
ring at the same time or shortly thereafter). Therefore, these early 
naturalizers grew up in households where parents had recently un-
dergone the civic and political education needed to gain citizenship 
status and who possess the resources needed to acquire citizenship 
for themselves and their children and so value in doing so.  Hence, as 
young citizens, these second generation youth are likely have been 
primed for political socialization: knowing that the polity is open and 
that civic participation is expected, they should be more receptive to 
appeals to protest, petition, voting, and contacting local and national 
elected officials.  
 
By contrast, later naturalization may therefore yield weaker causal 
impact than the earlier, family centered naturalization process. When 
naturalization occurs later in life, it is more likely to be the conse-
quence, rather than the cause, of socioeconomic integration and polit-
ical and civic engagement. Acquisition of citizenship when an adult 
is much more likely to be one’s own decision and not one directly 
resulting from or related to those of one’s parents. Individuals with 
higher levels of education, who are interested in US politics, and 
whose friendship and familial networks encourage political and civic 
participation, might choose to naturalize as adults in order to partici-
pate more completely. Thus for these individuals naturalization is 
more likely to be endogeneous to political and civic outcomes, as 
suggested by likely future of the undocumented immigrant rights 
activists who have been mobilized through informal channels outside 
the mainstream political process and have gained political awareness 
well before they are even eligible for citizenship.7  
                                                 
7 The results presented in the following pages derive from a series of regressions, 
entering variables for parents’ legal status at the time of arrival; respondent’s legal 
status at time of arrival (separate dummy variables for entered undocumented and 
entered with a temporary visa); citizenship status (birth or alien) and age at natural-
ization; language spoken at home while a child; parents’ English language ability; 
whether parent returned to homeland when respondent was a child; whether parent 
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2.1 Political participation  
 
We first examine civic and political participation, such as belonging 
to an organization, contacting a government official, whether by tel-
ephone, email, or in person; attending any political meetings, rallies, 
speeches or dinners in support of a political candidate; and taking 
part in any form of protest, such as picketing, a march, demonstration 
or boycott. We also look at electoral participation among current 
citizens, such as being registered to vote and voting in the past elec-
tion. 
 
In the literature, politics typically begins and ends with status citi-
zens.  To be sure, not all status citizens are of the same class: formal 
barriers to participation and lack of rights can effectively create a 
second class citizenry, whose collective engagements – whether 
waged under the banner of equality on grounds of race, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, sexual preference, or what have you --  involve citi-
zenship struggles.   
 
But in accepting the arrival of foreigners from abroad, states simulta-
neously accede to the growth of a population that lives on the territo-
ry but lacks status citizenship. In a democratic society, exclusion 
from the polity does not imply exclusion from politics.  Non-citizens 
enjoy the core civil rights of freedom of expression and assembly: 
they can engage in a variety of nonelectoral political and civic activi-
ties, whether in their capacity as parents, neighbors, or political ac-
tors who might demonstrate in the street or might even directly pres-
sure politicians. However, relatively few actually do so, only eight 
                                                                                                                 
sent home remittances when respondent was a child; whether a parent never moved 
to the United States; years of education for parent with highest years; respondent’s 
years of education; respondent’s age.  In addition, the regressions include six con-
textual variables, the nature of which is fully explained in prior chapters.   
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percent of the Los Angeles respondents reported participation in at 
least two of the three different forms of civic participation mentioned  
by the interviewers. Moreover, political participation significantly 
overlaps – in other words, group of engaged second-generation men 
and women who belong to organizations are also more likely to par-
ticipate in non-electoral politics. 
 
What might predict immigrant engagement and political participa-
tion? As discussed in the introduction, some aspects of political life 
are exclusively reserved for citizens, but others are not.  While non-
citizens can’t vote or run for elected office, they can contact elected 
officials, participate in protest or join organizations, just like every-
one else. And while politicians may not be interested in reaching out 
to persons who can’t vote, non-citizens are nonetheless affected by 
politicians’ decisions, news of which are broadcast to anyone who 
cares to pay attention, legal or citizenship notwithstanding.  In short, 
while the electorate is clearly bounded, the boundary between society 
and the polity is fuzzier, with many aspects of political life accessible 
to all. 
 
Some aspects of the social environment, however, may discourage 
non-electoral participation. Political life has a fundamentally social 
core, with participation responsive to the level and intensity of politi-
cal involvement in one’s own social circles, through which political 
information also flows (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The timing of 
naturalization may affect these social triggers of political engage-
ment, as non-citizen youths and young adults remaining outside the 
electorate may be isolated from the social pressures that ignite politi-
cal participation. Context is also likely to matter: if non-citizen im-
migrant offspring mainly live among other aliens and  if receiving 
society politics still remain alien to those immigrant neighbours who 
are citizens, then foreign-born, but US-raised persons are likely to 
find themselves in an environment where politics is of low, if any 
salience, which reinforces detachment. And exposure to messages 
directed at voters may not be enough to stimulate participation: since 
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political mobilization often triggers political interest and knowledge 
and those efforts are directed at likely voters with ever-greater pin-
point efficiency, the informational or motivational spillovers that 
campaigns inherently generate may not reach those residents outside 
the polity. 1.5 generation members lacking citizenship when crossing 
the threshold of adulthood may also ignore US centered politics in 
favor of homeland events or focus their attentions to other elements 
of their social world and community.  
 
Formal exclusion of non-citizens not only impedes political engage-
ment; it heightens the barriers inherent in the immigrants’ status as 
newcomers from a foreign polity unfamiliar with the practices and 
institutions of the polity where they now reside. Low as they may be, 
the incentives to acquire citizenship are far greater than those moti-
vating an engagement with a strange political system; the obligatory 
detachment from political participation produced by alien status may 
long persist, even after citizenship has been acquired.  
 
To be sure, the children of immigrants are exposed to political ideas.  
But the relevant information and ideas about politics, political par-
ties, and government may stem from the parental place of origin ra-
ther than their own current residence; whether any such exposure 
encourages or discourages political participation will vary greatly 
depending on the state and polity of origin. Furthermore, the infor-
mational component of that package is likely to be of limited use, 
given the particularities of each country’s political structure. Finally, 
as emphasized by the rational choice approach advocated by neo-
assimilation theory, adaptation is driven by the rewards it yields. But 
attending to politics, especially when it entails learning the details of 
an entirely new system, is unlikely to do the immigrant much good. 
The years spent in alien status are unlikely to help illuminate the 
mysteries of the new political environment for immigrant parents.  
Making sense of that environment will also be affected by the politi-
cal legacy imported from abroad, as learning how to orienting one-
self towards politics after immigration may entail unlearning of the 
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similar lessons absorbed before emigration.  Insofar as the most im-
portant imported lesson taught immigrants that politics is a dirty 
game rarely or never yielding results, the impediments to learn and 
attend will be all the higher. Such parents are unlikely to pass an 
ethos of participation and engagement to their children. 
 
Of course, even in the absence of family political socialization, these 
barriers to participation faced by immigrant parents may be over-
come by the broader socialization process in US schools and US so-
ciety for the immigrant offspring. But as many of the immigrants’ 
children are themselves immigrants, the obstacle of noncitizen status 
may inhibit participation in a similar fashion. And as argued above, 
whether native-born or not, whether citizens or not, the immigrants’ 
immediate descendants are unlikely to receive the same political so-
cialization as those of their peers who are both native born and chil-
dren of the native-born. Most importantly, political signals received 
from parents may differ in both quantity and quality, as parental dis-
engagement, and even more so, exclusion from the polity is likely to 
transmit messages of both an explicit and implicit kind. 
 
Indeed, IIMMLA data show that time spent outside of the polity ex-
ercises significant effects on a broad range of political and civic out-
comes. Moreover, those impacts appear regardless of whether the 
outcomes require formal membership or not. Thus, participation in 
civic life and non-electoral political activity is open to all residents of 
the United States, regardless of citizenship or legal status; the envi-
ronment is likely to have been all the more open in the increasingly 
liberal, increasingly immigrant-friendly region where the IIMMLA 
respondents resided. Nonetheless, civic life is more likely to elicit 
engagement from citizens than non-citizens; even among the natural-
ized, time spent outside the polity is likely to have a negative impact 
on involvement in non-electoral politics and civic matters, activities 
legally open to all. 
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As Robert Putnam (1995) famously lamented, Americans are in-
creasingly bowling alone.  Nonetheless, bowling clubs are generally 
open to each and all, with rarely a requirement for status citizenship.  
The answers provided by the survey’s respondents suggest that there 
may indeed be a good deal of bowling alone in southern California: 
just over 80 percent of the respondents answered negatively when 
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asked whether they belonged to any community organization, work 
organization, sports team, or some other non-religious organization.  
This share varies only slightly by immigrant status with just under 
17% of the 1.5 generation and 20% of the second generation report-
ing any memberships in contrast to almost 22% for those born to 
native parents. By contrast, late naturalizers and non-citizens were 
significantly less likely to report any organizational membership 
(16% and 11% respectively) than either citizens or earlier naturali-
zers, even though the list of possible organizations includes sports 
teams and soccer is surely an immigrant passion  Beyond these asso-
ciational activities of a conventional sort, likely to interest people 
regardless of immigrant or ethnic background, these immigrant off-
spring were also asked about participating in organizations linked to 
their parents or their own country of origin; with this form of asso-
ciational involvement added in, almost one of every four respondents 
could be classified as a “joiner”. Although this augmented definition 
curiously points to expanded differences, as 26 percent of the native 
born and 28 percent of young naturalizers reported belonging to 
some organization, as opposed to only 13 percent of the non-citizens, 
status lost some of its salience with the application of controls, only 
proving significant at the .1 level. 
 
Larger gaps emerge when we look at the three forms of non-electoral 
politics -- contacting a government official, whether by telephone, 
email, or in person; attending any political meetings, rallies, speeches 
or dinners in support of a political candidate; and taking part in any 
form of protest, such as picketing, a march, demonstration or boycott 
– in which respondents might have engaged in during the 12 months 
prior to the survey. Participation is a minority phenomenon: 66 per-
cent of the 1.5 generation respondents have no involvement in any of 
the three types of activities measured by the survey as do 61% of the 
second-generation respondents, and even among the 3rd generation 
control groups the share is 58%.  
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Disaggregating the children of immigrants further, the impacts of 
prior and/or current exclusion as well as foreignness are readily per-
ceptible. 1.5 generation non-citizens were the most likely not to en-
gage in any one of the three different activities (71% no activity), 
closely followed by those respondents who naturalized as late ado-
lescents or adults (ages 17 to 20 and 21 to 30) where around 65% 
report no activity. A somewhat larger gap emerges when comparing 
respondents with parents who spoke no English (71% no activity) 
with those whose parents were English-speaking (59% no activity). 
Probabilities predicted from the final model show that controls di-
minish these disparities by about half though they remain statistically 
significant – with levels of civic activity 5 percent higher among citi-
zens than among the non-naturalized and 7 percent higher among the 
children of English-speaking parents than among those whose par-
ents without English proficiency.  Interestingly, the answers to the 
survey suggested that respondents were more likely to engage in pro-
test activity (11%) than to attend a political meeting (7%); while pa-
rental language ability had no effect on protest activity, non-citizens 
and late naturalizers and those who naturalized as children lagged 
behind birthright citizens in this activity, even after all controls in the 
final model.   
 
Unlike learning the dominant language – the rewards of which are 
sufficiently large for individual immigrants do so on their own, with-
out urging or support – the individual rewards of political involve-
ment are too scanty to provide much motivation, which is why mobi-
lization by parties, interest groups, neighbors or friends proves so 
crucial, with the latter two possibly providing both reinforcement and 
moral example. Answers from IIMMLA respondents indicate that 
only a minority (barely over a third) received encouragement of this 
sort from people whom they knew.   Encouragement from the politi-
cally active turned out to be significantly less common among all 
foreign-born respondents, whether having naturalized or not.  Not 
surprisingly, non-citizens were the least likely to have had any con-
tacts with the politically active, reporting a rate at just over 60 per-
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cent of the native born level (25% vs 41%), after controls. Likewise, 
parental foreignness had a negative impact on respondents’ contacts 
with politically active persons, though with effects not quite as de-
pressive as those of non-citizen status. 
 
Not only are the once excluded and the formally excluded less likely 
to engage in activities with no formal, citizenship bar; the once ex-
cluded, notwithstanding their own prior success in clearing the citi-
zenship hurdle, are less likely to engage in political activities for 
which citizenship is a prerequisite. Among those respondents pos-
sessing US citizenship, 80 percent report that they registered to vote.  
However, the late naturalizers and the young adult naturalizers were 
less likely to do so than either the birthright citizens or the early natu-
ralizers, a statistically significant difference that even increased  after 
all controls were applied.8 Similarly, a somewhat smaller proportion 
(57 percent) of all naturalized respondents actually voted in the most 
recent election conducted prior to the survey than those who had 
birthright citizenship (59%). Again applying control variables in-
creases this discrepancy: our model predicts a turnout of 50% among 
those who naturalized as adults as compared to 63% among the na-
tive born second generation. In contrast foreignness, as indexed by 
parents’ English-language ability, had small and inconsistent effects, 
moderately reducing the likelihood of registering to vote, but having 
little effect on actual voting.   
                                                 
8 Our model predicts that with everything else held equal, those who naturalized as 
adults had a registration rate of about 70% while it is 82% in the second genera-
tion. 
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2.2 Political efficacy 
 
Thus, formal exclusion from the polity – whether prior or ongoing – 
impedes participation, across numerous forms of engagement and 
regardless of whether involvement entails electoral activity or not.  
But do those same factors lead the immigrant offspring to view the 
U.S. political system as so distant as to be incomprehensible and im-
pervious to input from below? 
 
Answers to these questions stem from queries designed to tap into 
two dimensions of political efficacy: one internal, related to feelings 
of personal political effectiveness; the second, external, related to the 
view that authorities, institutions, and elites respond to popular pref-
erences.  In the first case, one perceives oneself to have skills and 
information needed to influence the political system; in the second, 
one sees that system as responsive. The IIMMLA survey tapped into 
these two dimensions with two statements to which respondents were 
asked to answer on a 4 point scale ranging from strongly agree to 
strong disagree. To assess external efficacy, the survey requested 
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responses to the statement: “Elected officials don’t care what people 
like me think;” to assess internal efficacy the survey asked inter-
viewees to react to the statement “I have a good understanding of 
politics.”  
 
Controlling for background variables, timing of naturalization was 
not related to the level of understanding. By contrast, respondents 
were more likely to report a poor understanding of politics when they 
had grown up in households characterized by higher levels of for-
eignness (as indicated by parents’ English ability and the use of Eng-
lish at home during childhoold). By contrast, social ties to the paren-
tal home country were associated with a higher level of internal effi-
cacy. Respondents from transnational families, where one (or more) 
parents were abroad, were more likely to claim a good understanding 
of politics than those who had no social ties (parents or relatives) 
abroad. Differences in perception of external efficacy take a similar 
form, as again, the variable indexing entry into the polity had no ef-
fect after controls. However, respondents whose parents lived abroad 
were less likely to see elected officials as responsive, with, after con-
trols, 22 percent endorsing a view that elected officials don’t care as 
opposed to 17 percent among those without relatives back home.  
Respondents whose parents sent remittances were similarly negative-
ly inclined, with 20 percent endorsing the view that elected officials 
don’t care versus 17 percent among all others.  
 
Other influences: education and home country connections 
 
The SES model of political participation features prominently in the 
political science literature, though a summary statement found in 
Verba and Nie’s canonical 1972 Participation in America – “Citizens 
(emphasis added) of higher social and economic status participate 
more in politics (125)” – suggests why this generalization may not 
fully hold for the population of interest to us.  To be sure, there are 
good reasons to take this view seriously: as political participation is 
costly, in terms of time, information, knowledge, and money, those 
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with more resources are better positioned to defray these costs.  Edu-
cation figures as a resource of particular importance, as it conveys 
knowledge about politics, generates the skills needed to make sense 
of complex issues and gain access to the ballot, and imparts the pro-
ficiencies required for more the more demanding activities of con-
tacting a politician or attending a meeting that we have already re-
viewed. 
 
Respondents’ own education yields positive effects on every out-
come of interest. However, as we have seen, schooling among 
IIMMLA respondents was heavily affected by parental legal status as 
well as the other resources that parents were able to transmit to their 
children. As we are also interested in following the causal chain, the 
degree to which outcomes were influenced by parents’ education is 
the more relevant variable and one more comparable to the factors 
that we have discussed so far. In fact, parents’ education has quite 
modest effects on participation, yielding increases at the .01 level on 
the probability of organizational membership and attendance at meet-
ings as well as conviction in elected officials’ responsiveness, while 
increasing the probability of engaging in any civic activity and in 
protest at the .1 level. However, even at its strongest, parental educa-
tion yields effects roughly comparable to those that we have re-
viewed so far. Thus, going from the 10th percentile (6 years) to the 
90th percentile (16 years) of parents’ schooling9 moves the probabil-
ity of organizational membership from .16 to .21, which tells us that 
probabilities of organizational participation are roughly the same 
among offspring of the least educated parents and late naturalizers, 
on the one hand, and birthright citizens and offspring of the most 
educated parents, on the other. 
 
Whereas the literature tells us to look for the influence of education, 
providing quite precise predictions, we have much less guidance 
                                                 
9 The distribution refers to the population under discussion only: foreign-born or 
foreign-origin offspring in Los Angeles. 
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when thinking about the effects of home country connections. Some 
of the literature on transnationalism contends that home country con-
nections are compatible with host country political engagement and 
that the former may actually facilitate latter. However, these asser-
tions suffer from shortcomings from two types:  the prediction lacks 
any rationale; and since the data report on political and cross-border 
activities like remitting or travel that take place more or less simulta-
neously with the political behavior being queried one doesn’t know 
whether it is transnationalism or participation that is cause or effect.  
Here, we find ourselves on more solid ground, as our indicators are 
based on reports about parents’ cross-border engagement at the time 
when respondents were still residing in the parental home. Interest-
ingly enough, respondents whose parents earlier sent home remit-
tances report higher levels of current political participation on all of 
the indicators reviewed in this chapter, with the sole exception of 
external efficacy, as noted above. Though the impacts are much less 
consistent and more modest, we also find a tendency for return travel 
to be associated with higher levels of political participation (with the 
exception of voting where there is a negative association p<0.1). As 
we have emphasized in chapter 3 and in the pages above, we antici-
pate that attachments – whether to the home country or to an ethnic 
group – are transmitted from parents to children, sometimes inten-
tionally, sometimes not. While that hypothesis sheds no light on the 
relationship between parental home country attachment and chil-
dren’s subsequent host country engagement, there may be indirect 
links of a variety of sorts. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 
children of remitters are highly likely to remit themselves; perhaps 
by remitting parents also conveyed the significance of the action and 
of the relationship to their offspring. But the giving of scarce re-
sources is both a moral action and an indicator of one’s embed-
dedness in social relations. If we think that remitting is an aspect of 
familial cohesion, we may then understand why parental remitting is 
linked to children’s later political engagement. 
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3. Finding a place in the political landscape 
 
Whether proceeding from the viewpoint of neo-assimilation or seg-
mented assimilation, sociologists focus on the boundary between 
minorities and the mainstream, in which ethnic origins are supposed-
ly of little or no importance. In politics however, no such thing as a 
mainstream exists. In a democracy, politics is inherently a domain of 
conflict (Pearson and Citrin, 2007) in which participants, whether 
citizens or not, have to take sides. From the perspective of the receiv-
ing polity the political alignment of newcomers can play out in two 
different ways. One path would lead the political counterpart to so-
cial assimilation to entail, “the replacement of ethnic division over 
time by cleavages based on class, gender, generation, or other cate-
gories that cut across ethnic lines, as suggested by Pearson and Citrin 
(222). Another trajectory, better captured with the term “political 
incorporation,” would see ethnic categories and political cleavages 
continuing to overlap to a significant degree. From this perspective, 
an association between of ethnic identity with party identity would 
be a persistent feature of immigrant political incorporation in the 
short as well as medium term. Either way, participation in politics 
must first entail orientation to the cleavages dividing the polity and 
then the decision of the faction with which to throw one’s lot. But 
what are the factors that shape the political orientations of the sec-
ond-generation? 
 
At least some of the features impeding political participation are also 
likely to stand in the way of understanding partisan divides and de-
veloping partisan loyalties. As political scientists have argued, parti-
san loyalties are transmitted from parents to children, a scenario un-
likely to be repeated in immigrant families, where parents often lack 
detailed knowledge of the political system, participate at much lower 
rates, and even when knowledgeable rarely possess the intense parti-
san loyalties that would breed similar attachments among their chil-
dren. Entering without knowledge, immigrants have a significant 
informational threshold to surpass. Thus, even though immigrant 
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offspring will almost certainly absorb information about the political 
system as part of everyday socialization, they are likely to enter the 
polity with a lower stock of knowledge and weaker political convic-
tions than those possessed by their peers born to citizen parents. 
Hence, as Hajnal and Lee (2011) have argued, immigrants and their 
offspring may lean towards independence, experiencing difficulty in 
making make meaningful differentiations among the parties and find-
ing it hard to determine the relevance of ideological differences to 
their own concerns. 
 
Alternatively, loyalties may be the result of a process of ongoing 
information collection, in which voters identify with one party or 
another based on their evaluation of a party’s cumulative perfor-
mance. In this process, existing political cleavages may give immi-
grant and immigrant-origin persons all the information they need to 
decide on partisan and ideological loyalties. To begin with, immigra-
tion policy is everywhere a source of conflict, for reasons that are 
bound up with the existence of nation-states themselves. Conflicts 
over “who gets what” presume that the boundaries of the state define 
the limits of the parties contending over who will get “what”.  Con-
flicts over foreign policy similarly assume that there is a national 
interest to be defended or protected.  By contrast, immigration policy 
is inherently about “them” – the actual and potential immigrants, a 
category that includes both the persons of foreign origin already liv-
ing on domestic soil as well as the foreigners currently living in for-
eign states, but who might want to immigrate. Since immigration 
policy involves both selection and exclusion, decisions about how 
many new immigrants to accept and of which type inevitably entail 
judgments about the desirability of those immigrants already in 
place. Because once over the territorial boundary, “they” have the 
opportunity to become part of and thereby change the national “we” 
questions about numbers and types of immigrants inexorably take on 
a cultural cast. 
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Thus, while immigrants are unlikely to endorse open borders, their 
preferences for closure are unlikely to match those of the native-
born, whose opposition to immigration might also be read as opposi-
tion to immigrants, whether naturalized citizens or not. Moreover, 
that fraction of the native-born population upset by tendencies to-
wards greater self-expression on behalf of any number of groups is 
unlikely to sit comfortably with the type of multicultural, liberal na-
tionalism that fits the immigrants better. And once made an issue of 
controversy, immigration policy is likely to generate further feed-
backs that influence immigrant partisan loyalties, as has often been 
the case in the past. While immigrant preferences can be ignored as 
long as they remain outside the polity, threats to immigrant rights 
change the costs and benefits of citizenship in ways that motivate 
eligible immigrants to cross the barrier of citizenship. Once inside 
the polity, immigrant voters can make their voices heard, a potential 
that motivates political elites and office holders to either gain immi-
grant votes and immigrant loyalties or make it difficult for immi-
grants to gain citizenship and if naturalized, to find a way to exercise 
the vote. When anti-immigrant voters comprise a core electoral 
block, politicians and office holders may be stuck between a rock 
and a hard place, unable to swivel toward immigrant preferences for 
fear of alienating the base, but therefore sacrificing a group of voters 
whose importance is only likely to grow with time. While those in-
centives rise with the extent to which immigrant votes can swing an 
election, not every party or politician can respond with equal ease. 
On the national level the Democratic Party seems to be poised to 
attract the large majority of votes from naturalized Americans and 
their children. The repelling effect of anti-immigrant sentiment is 
likely to be most salient among those who feel that their “group” 
faces discrimination from the national majority population. In this 
way, for some immigrants and their children at least, the develop-
ment of immigrant partisan loyalties may be endogenous to the poli-
tics and process of immigration itself. On the other hand, those im-
migrants greeted by welcoming, possibly supportive policies and 
fleeing repressive, left-wing regimes may find that their natural home 
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lies in the Republican Party, especially as Republican leaders proved 
repeatedly willing to open doors for immigrants in flight from Com-
munist regimes. The waves of Cuban refugees who arrived in the 
years between the Cuban revolution and the earlier 1970s, and the 
immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union who began entering the United 
States in the 1970s exemplify this alternative pattern. 
 
In moving into the American polity, immigrants encounter a system 
structured around lines of race and ethnicity, divides which in turn 
are likely to influence partisan preferences and ideological loyalties.    
The ethnic social ties that migrants rely on in the migration and set-
tlement process can be translated into political loyalties, as the social 
ties that help migrants find jobs, housing or social services, can ex-
tend into the electoral process. The urban political machines of the 
19th and 20th century were masters at the game of building political 
loyalties by easing the pains of settlement. Political entrepreneurs 
provided material assistance, access to government services and jobs 
as well as symbolic recognition and new Americans in turn delivered 
a dependable block of votes. While these urban political machines 
may have lost much of their influence since their heyday a century 
ago, local party organizations still exercise considerable influence, 
overlapping with ethnic networks. In some cases community based 
organizations (CBOs) that deliver social services in immigrant 
neighborhoods also engage in electoral politics thereby effectively 
re-creating the patron-type exchange relationship that characterized 
urban machine politics (Marwell 2004). 
 
The district-based election system in the U.S. in combination with 
patterns of residential concentration by ethnicity or national origin, 
provides further opportunities for ethnic politics, especially at the 
state and local level where electoral districts often closely track “eth-
nic neighborhoods” and ethnic segregation thereby produces majori-
ty-minority districts. Districts that align immigrant neighborhoods 
include citizens as well as non-citizens and thereby “…reinforce the 
linkages of interests in these populations” offering newcomers “the 
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opportunity to develop and awareness of U.S. politics that is shaped 
in an ethnic context.” (DeSipio 2001: 97). On the other hand elected 
representatives from these districts also represent populations in 
which a relatively high share is under the age of 18 or non-citizen 
and thus ineligible to vote (de la Garza & DeSipio 1993). Depending 
on the competitiveness of elections, incumbents may be better served 
simply mobilizing their core support rather than mobilizing the entry 
of new voters whose loyalties and behaviors may be hard to predict. 
 
Apart from shaping the electoral mobilization of immigrants, these 
features of the political system also influence how immigrants and 
their children align with party politics. For example as political par-
ties become less active in mobilizing new voting constituencies and 
non-party institutions such as labor unions and civic associations 
become relatively more important, partisanship among new voters 
may decline and the share of those choosing not to align with a party, 
but rather identifying as independents may increase. Political geog-
raphy may similarly matter as larger political districts, which make 
narrowly targeted ethnic mobilization less useful could also dampen 
partisan alignments.  
 
As documented by Louis DiSipio and others, nationwide, political 
parties have lost a good deal of their capacity to pull newcomers into 
electoral politics is a nationwide phenomenon (DiSepio 2001). Still 
there are significant differences across contexts. Though certainly 
much diminished as compared to its heyday, the Democratic Party 
still is the dominant force in New York City politics and has signifi-
cant organizational capacity. In contrast non-partisan elections in 
otherwise Democratically-leaning Los Angeles further diminish the 
influence of party organizations.  
 
Similarly the political geography of Los Angeles will diminish not 
only mobilization but also the dominance of one party. Whereas the 
city of New York also is the relevant political unit, Los Angeles 
County is fractured consisting of 88 separate political jurisdictions 
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with only a third of immigrants living in the City of Los Angles 
(Mollenkopf et al. 2001, p.36). The county of Los Angeles in turn, 
though an important political unit is governed by only 5 supervisors 
each representing more than 2 million people and are elected in dis-
tricts that cover very large and diverse districts. In New York in con-
trast though the City Council is the only local legislative body for the 
more than 8 million inhabitants of the city, the city council districts 
are relatively small and often closely track ethnic neighborhoods. As 
Mollenkopf, Olson and Ross (2001) point out in their comparison of 
immigrant politics in New York City and Los Angeles, the overall 
political context in New York City promotes immigrant participation 
to a much greater degree than does the political structure of the Los 
Angeles Metropolitan region. These differences in context also shape 
how those growing up in immigrant family align themselves in elec-
toral politics. 
 
3.1 Political identity   
 
Our discussion of partisan loyalties begins in the next section; here 
we follow Hajnal and Lee in insisting on a logically prior question, 
namely one’s capacity to orient oneself to the prevailing political 
divides. One indicator comes from a response to questions about par-
tisan loyalty, from which we create a variable distinguishing those 
who answer either Democrat, Republican, or Independent from those 
respondents who say they don’t know, refuse to answer, or respond 
by saying that they don’t think of themselves in partisan terms. On 
this measure, the U.S. born children look much like their third gener-
ation counterparts born in the United States and socialized by U.S.-
born parents: in both cases, a large majority identifies with at least 
one of the conventional, U.S. partisan categories of Democrat, Re-
publican, or Independent. Finding a place in the partisan spectrum 
proved harder for the foreign-born respondents, however: a quarter 
of the non-naturalizers and one sixth of the late naturalizers do not 
connect with any of the conventional partisan identities, being signif-
icantly less likely to give any one of three conventional partisan la-
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bels, a gap that persists in the full model. Though respondents who 
grew up in the linguistically most foreign environment were about as 
likely as the late naturalizers to report a partisan identification, the 
relationship between parental linguistic ability and possessing a con-
ventional partisan identity was only significant at the .1 level. 
 
A related question about ideology provides yet another clue about the 
capacity of immigrant offspring to orient themselves to the relevant 
divides in a political system that either they or their parents encoun-
tered as foreign.  Though the conventional left-right divide derives 
from the French Revolution, respondents found it easier to categorize 
themselves on the liberal-conservative spectrum than to identify an 
appropriate place in the party line-up. 91 percent identified as either 
conservative, liberal, or moderate, with no significant differences 
related to either generation or citizenship status or experiences.   In 
the regression, late naturalizers were less able to situate themselves 
ideologically, whereas that option was more readily selected by the 
offspring of undocumented immigrants and of respondents whose 
parents remitted, and of those with a parent residing abroad. 
 
As a last effort to capture respondents’ capacity to make sense of the 
political system, we combine responses from the questions about 
both partisan loyalties and placement on the left to right spectrum to 
create a three category variable:  one corresponds to the very few 
respondents (4%) to whom prevailing political divisions seem to 
make no sense, unable to identify both a partisan identity and an ide-
ological placement; a second reflects the answers of those – nearly 
one fifth – selecting either a partisan or an ideological placement; a 
third corresponds to the great majority providing a politically appro-
priate answer to both questions. Whereas almost all respondents were 
able to find some bearing on the political system, lack of citizenship 
nonetheless made for greater uncertainty, as only 69 percent of the 
non-citizens were able to identify both an ideological placement and 
a partisan identity as opposed to 78 percent among the citizens.  Net 
of controls, not only the non-citizens (p=.76), but also the late natu-
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ralizers (p=.7) fell short of the birthright citizens (p=.8) in their ca-
pacity to clearly situate themselves on the political spectrum. 
 
 
3.2 Partisanship 
 
To examine partisanship we look at the subset of respondents who 
possess citizenship and are also registered to vote. We first continue 
our analysis of the Los Angeles survey using the same set of control 
variables as above. We then include data from the New York City 
survey which not only increases sample size and variance on origin 
country characteristics but also allows us draw comparisons across 
receiving contexts. To facilitate interpretation we use so-called ter-
nary plots which position groups according to their three-party regis-
tration in a triangle whereby the position in the space represents the 
share of a group (or probability of a particular respondent) being reg-
istered in each party. 10 
 
                                                 
10 Since the answer categories to the question about party registration were slightly 
different in the LA and NYC surveys, we restrict the sample to those who register 
either for one of the major parties or as independents. This omits a small number of 
respondents in both surveys. 
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The most striking finding from the regression results entail the ab-
sence of any robust associations between party registration, on the 
one hand, and any of the individual level measures of language com-
petency, arrival- and citizenship status, on the other. As the left panel 
in figure XX below shows, the 1.5, 2nd, and 3rd generations hold 
very similar positions in the party-space, a pattern that remains un-
changed after applications of controls. By contrast, only the demo-
graphic controls of age, gender and parental education prove consist-
ently significant. With controls applied, moving up the age spectrum 
from our younger respondents (20) to the older end (35) yields a sig-
nificant increase in Republican Party registration (from about 19% to 
about 35%) and correspondent decreases in both Democratic and 
Independent registration. 
 
Figure XX, ternary plots 1,2: Ternary plots of  predicted probabili-
ties of party registration by generation and age. 
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Yet these demographic differences are overshadowed by the gaps in 
partisan loyalties separating both ethnic/national origin groups and 
the two metropolitan places. In Ternary Plots 3-6 we plot immigrant 
groups in black, native minority groups in red and native non-
Hispanic Whites in blue. Comparing across places we see that both 
native and immigrant groups alike are significantly more Democratic 
and less Republican and less Independent in New York as compared 
to Los Angeles. In Los Angeles the spectrum of political allegiance 
is bounded by native Whites on the conservative / Republican end 
and native Blacks on the progressive Democratic end of the registra-
tion spectrum. In New York City, Taiwanese, and the two national 
origin groups from the former USSR, Russians and Ukrainians, are 
more likely than native whites to identify as Republicans  
 
 
 
Ternary plots 3 to 6: Ternary plots of partisan registration in Los Angeles 
and New York City. Native whites are plotted in blue. Native minority 
groups (Puerto Ricans and Blacks in NYC; 3rd generation Mexicans and 
Blacks in Los Angeles) are plotted in red. Immigrant groups are plotted in 
black. Grey areas indicate areas of detail in figures below 
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A regression model that includes both individual level and our 
group-level variables lets us explore some of this variation. We see 
that respondents from darker skinned national origin groups, who 
likely experience a more adverse societal reception, are much more 
heavily Democratic (p<0.05) while those from more traditionally 
oriented origin societies are more heavily Republican (p<0.1). As 
Ternary Plots 7-9 show, the differences are in fact not trivial: a move 
from the lighter end of the skin color distribution (2 on the 10 point 
scale; minimum observed is 1.4) to a 7 (the maximum observed in 
our sample is a 7.4) is associated with an almost 40 point increase in 
Democratic registration (from 39% to 75%), a significant decrease in 
republican registration and a small decrease in probability of register-
ing as independent. Though differences on the rational-traditional 
axis yields somewhat smaller effects, move from the most secular 
end of the scale as measured in the World Values Survey (2) to the 
most traditional end (-2) translates into about a 10 point decrease in 
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registration as Independent and an almost corresponding increase in 
share registered as Republican.  
 
In this larger sample we do find that counter to expectations about 
the lack of political socialization in immigrant families, some evi-
dence for an influence of parental familiarity with the host country, 
as measured in their English ability, on children’s political align-
ments. The substantive impact of these differences is small however 
with a 5 point decrease in Democratic registration when comparing 
parents with the least language ability to those where both are well 
versed in English and corresponding small increases in Republican 
and Independent registration.  
 
Ternary plots 7 through 9: Predicted marginal probability of party 
registration varying average national origin group skin color and 
sending country traditionalism. 
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Conclusion 
 
As this chapter has shown, a paradox lies at the heart of the encoun-
ter between international migration and democratic citizenship: im-
migrants and their offspring find citizenship at once easily accessible 
yet also persistently elusive. The immigrant offspring with whom we 
are concerned have had the good fortune of growing up in a demo-
cratic society where civic and political participation is open to all 
comers, whether the newest arrivals off the plane with foreign pass-
port still in hand or nationals who can trace their presence on U.S. 
soil back for centuries.  Although the majority of the second genera-
tion New Yorkers and Angelenos studied here possessed U.S. citi-
zenship by birthright, 9 out of 20 had been born abroad; as of the 
surveys, 3 out of 20 remained foreign nationals, lacking U.S. citizen-
ship.  And while the non-citizens, like their citizen counterparts, of-
ten abjured from participation in civic and political life, they also 
frequently engaged – evidence that passage across the external 
boundary at the territorial line can suffice for partaking in the com-
munal affairs of the people among whom one lives, even if one 
stands outside the formal, internal boundary of that community. 
 
But just how to understand the sources of that engagement, as well as 
the factors that constrain it, is quite another matter.  Extending assim-
ilation theory from the sphere of social to civic and political life pro-
vides but limited illumination. The individual search for the better 
life may account for why immigrants and their offspring might pick 
up the dominant tongue or acquire new skills that offer greater re-
ward, but it cannot possibly explain civic and political engagement: 
in the short run, at least, investing in any communal effort yields 
individual costs outweighing the benefits; and the need to work with 
others to pursue some collective goal implies that individual effort 
alone doesn’t always secure that better life.  To be sure, the quest for 
that better life yields by-products that can foster engagement with 
political and civic life, as when the acquisition of dominant language 
skills increases one’s ability to understand an initially foreign politi-
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cal environment. As we have seen, one channel from the social to the 
political aspects of assimilation does indeed seem to lead from higher 
levels of parents’ own capacity in English to their adult children’s 
greater involvement in civic or political affairs of varying types.  
And yet the lessons likely to be learned from enhanced comprehen-
sion of the political environment are unlikely to be compatible with 
the assimilation framework, since the environment in question lacks 
an established, consensual mainstream. Rather, because the political 
world is characterized by conflict, in which opposing groups and 
parties contend over how the mainstream is to be divided and by 
whom, enhanced learning takes the form of gaining orientation to the 
relevant divides and positioning oneself appropriately. Moreover, 
those divides are endogenous to immigration itself, resulting from 
profound disagreement related to the appropriate degree of open-ness 
or closure to ongoing and future arrivals from abroad as well as dis-
putes linked to expectations for conformity as opposed to pluralism 
after the immigrants have arrived. As both sources of division reflect 
other deeply rooted conflicts, especially those related to equal rights, 
protection, and treatment of ethnic minorities, these prior struggles as 
well as their resolution affect the pathways to political incorporation 
followed by immigrants and their offspring. 
 
Segmented assimilation, the most influential alternative approach, 
appears still less useful. To begin with, extrapolating from the social 
to the political sphere does not yield clear predictions: the different 
segments into which this approach forecasts assimilation bear no 
relationship to the ideological and partisan cleavages along which the 
polity is divided; while the theory contends that groups differ in their 
policy reception, it simultaneously contends that all non-European 
immigrants experience societal reception, which leaves one wonder-
ing which contextual factor will affect political and civic engagement 
and why. Nor is it clear whether home country language use in the 
parental household – an indicator of ethnic retention and therefore 
selective acculturation -- should increase or decrease civic or politi-
cal engagement and if so, what might account for any such effect.  
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In any case, our analysis provides little support for the factors on 
which segmented assimilation places greatest weight. Thus, group 
differences in skin color yielded no effects whatsoever, as the coeffi-
cient for this variable failed to reach statistical significance across all 
of the civic and political outcomes reviewed in this chapter. The in-
dicator of policy reception barely fared better, yielding positive ef-
fects on only two outcomes – involvement in a home country organi-
zation and being encouraged to support a candidate or political party 
– suggesting a channel from the greater density of persons with legal 
status to participation, net of individual legal status, though why such 
effects are not more widespread is not clear.  By contrast, higher lev-
els of education at the group level had statistically significant, but 
negative effects on civic participation and organizational member-
ship, pointing to the possibility that greater resources at the group-
level, independent on individual resources, reduced the need to pur-
sue common solutions through collective action.  Finally, use of the 
mother tongue in the parental household positively increased the 
probability in engaging in at least one of three forms of civic partici-
pation and also proved to have a positive association with respond-
ents’ claim to have a good understanding of the political system.  
Yet, a standard assimilation variable – parents’ own understanding of 
English – generated far more consistent and powerful effects. 
 
By contrast, the analysis developed in this chapter demonstrates how 
a cross-border perspective can illuminate the ways in which the dis-
tinctive features of migration across state boundaries yield long-term 
impacts on political and civic engagement. While international mi-
gration brings strangers into a strange environment, strangeness di-
minishes with time and social learning, facilitating movement across 
the internal boundary of citizenship as well as greater involvement in 
civic and social life. Yet, as we have emphasized, the migrants ar-
rive, not just as strangers, but as citizens of the foreign polity that 
they left and also as aliens in the society that they have joined.  
Moreover, whereas citizens are formal equals, the de jure and de fac-
to policies that govern migration controls produce formal inequality 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 58 
59 
among non-citizens, who vary in status and corresponding entitle-
ments. 
 
Those differences matter for transitioning across the internal bounda-
ry of citizenship. As the history of U.S. citizenship shows, the per-
meability of that boundary is a by-product of U.S. history, as the 
relatively low barriers to naturalization – most importantly, the five 
year eligibility term – are best understood as a policy designed to 
attract the population needed to seize, control, and settle the land 
taken from the indigenous inhabitants of North America. While the 
reaction against the explicit use of racial and ethnic criteria in both 
access to entry and eligibility for citizenship has in some ways led to 
increased permeability, that impact is offset by a counter-trend in-
volving the imposition of racially-neutral, but resource demanding, 
and hence class-biased, criteria for eligibility. Dating from the Natu-
ralization Act of 1906, the counter-trend has entailed a combination 
of fees, examinations, and ever-more careful scrutiny of the prospec-
tive citizens’ background. Indeed, the 1988 decision to convert the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (and later Citizenship and 
Immigration Services) into an agency funded entirely by user fees 
ensured that naturalization would become the financially daunting 
endeavor it is today. And though there are tentative efforts to ease up 
on some of these financial demands – for example, by allowing ap-
plicants to pay with credit cards, rather than in cash – conflict over 
access to what remains a privileged status has thus far constrained 
efforts at encouraging immigrants to become Americans. 
 
Hence, the barriers to naturalization, which discriminate against 
those potential Americans lacking the material and informational 
resources needed to leap over this hurdle, confront the immigrant 
offspring studied in this book with a significant challenge. Although 
the U.S.-born among them enjoy citizenship by birthright, many 
grow up in households where non-citizenship status proves persistent 
among one or even both parents. That pattern is all the more preva-
lent among the 1.5 generation of persons born abroad, but raised in 
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the United States, for whom the acquisition of citizenship is often a 
protracted process. As shown in the family level analysis, respond-
ent’s foreign-birth depresses family-level citizenship density, net of 
controls, indicating that the 1.5 generation respondents remain in 
intimate environments where the presence of citizens is low. While 
citizenship densities rise with years of settlement, the strong coeffi-
cients for parents’ and respondents’ years of education point to the 
importance of material resources in conditioning the capacity to clear 
the impediments to citizenship; likewise parents’ acquisition of Eng-
lish language skills underlines the centrality of informational re-
sources. Material and information resources are also highlighted by 
the individual-level analysis, which, like the family-level analysis, 
shows a resource spillover from the group level, as citizenship densi-
ty and acquisition become increasingly common as average levels of 
education grow. The individual level analysis also demonstrates the 
influence of another factor that most analyses have previously ig-
nored: namely, legal status upon entry: as the individual-level analy-
sis showed, among our 1.5 generation Los Angeles respondents, 
those who entered the U.S. either as temporary “non-immigrants” or 
in an undocumented status were significantly less likely to gain citi-
zenship than those who arrived as lawful permanent residents.  Thus, 
in addition to factors related to social stratification, the civic stratifi-
cation by status produced by policies directed to control movement 
across the external boundary yields subsequent effects on mobility 
across the internal boundary. 
 
As we have seen, barriers to the acquisition of citizenship serve as 
impediments to the exercise of citizenship, even though non-citizens 
and citizens share the very same rights to many forms of civic and 
political citizenship. The widespread effects of current and prior non-
citizenship status are all the more striking in light of the fact that in 
its overwhelming majority, the 1.5 generation respondents grew up 
as de facto Americans, as 50 percent report coming to the U.S. at age 
2 or under, a fraction only marginally lower among those respond-
ents who still lacked citizenship as of adulthood. Yet the experience 
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of life as de facto Americans frequently failed to produce the level of 
political and civic involvement enjoyed by the de jure Americans, 
with the disparities observed before and after the application controls 
generally the same. Thus, for many of the de facto Americans, simp-
ly understanding the basic contours of the U.S. political system 
proved challenging, as both the late naturalizers and the non-citizens 
were less likely to select any conventional partisan loyalty and were 
least likely to be able to both place themselves on an ideological 
spectrum and select a partisan identification. While the competencies 
generated by social assimilation unquestionably contribute to the 
capacity for understanding the political environment, the signals pro-
vided in one’s immediate environment also help. However, those 
signals are precisely what many of the de facto Americans lack, as 
they were significantly less likely to be encouraged to support a can-
didate or political party – a result possibly related to their higher ten-
dency towards civic detachment, as the non-citizens, as well as the 
adolescent and later adult naturalizers showed the least propensity to 
engage in civic or associational activity open to all comers, citizen-
ship status notwithstanding.   
 
Thus migration controls have a far longer reach than established per-
spectives allow, constraining civic and political participation well 
after both external and even internal boundaries have been crossed.  
Nonetheless, the path dependent results of America’s early develop-
ment remain deeply influential, which is why the great majority of 
the adult immigrant offspring studied in this book found that the door 
to engagement with public issues nonetheless remained open.  Yet 
their options for political engagement were shaped by prior histories 
of political development and conflict, reflected both in differences 
between New York and Los Angeles – with the former tilted more 
heavily towards affiliation with Democrats than the latter – and in the 
political preferences of third generation whites, blacks, and Latinos, 
each with a distinctive position in the political spectrum.  Of course, 
the picture we present is one that we see by looking backward and 
the political developments that have transpired since the turn of the 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 58 
62 
millennium when these two surveys were conducted have likely 
made for somewhat altered levels of engagement and changed affilia-
tions.  Any such changes, we suspect, are less affected by the factors 
related to origins, context, and strategies of adaptation highlighted in 
this book, but are instead driven by the conflicts over the very pres-
ence of the immigrants and immigrants offspring we have studied 
and the increasingly deep cleavages that these conflicts have riven. 
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